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lN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
S1'ATE OF UTAH, by and through 
its Road Commission, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
LLOYD STANGER and EDNA 
OLSON STANGER, his wife, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case 
No. 11028 
BRIEF OF RESP'O,NDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a higlnvay condenmation case. The issues on 
appeal relate to whether or not the jury received proper 
instructions concerning severance damages. 
DISPOSITION IN LOvVER COURT 
The parties stipulated to the value of the land taken. 
The only issue given to the jury was what amount, if 
nny, should defendants receive as severance damage. 
The jury found that defendants' remaining land was 
not damaged. The Court signed a judgment on that 
verdict, and denied defendants' Motion for New Trial. 
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RE!LIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The jury verdict should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent agrees with the Statement of Facts as 
set forth by appellants, except it wishes to have it fully 
noted that the street grade in front of appellants' prop-
erty was not disturbed and the taking as evidenced by 
plaintiff's Exhibit "A" was in front of an unimproved 
portion of appellant's property which, in fact, was done 
for the benefit of appellants. Had this property not been 
taken and paid for by the state, presuniably appellants 
would have been required to take their own property 
and construct what is in effect a frontage access road 
to the highway system. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
IN EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEEDINGS, DAMAGES 
CAN OCCUR TO PROPERTY WHICH ARE COM-
PENSABLE AND NONCOMPENSABLE. IN THIS 
CASE THERE WERE NO DAMAGES OF EITHER 
KIND. 
Throughout the trial of this case, the Trial Judge 
correctly infonned the jury of situations where land-
owners could not recover damages to remaining proper-
ties in Eminent Domain proceedings because damage 
to the remainder was consequential and noncompensable 
(Tr. 41-44; 45-46; 63-6-1-; 70; 81-82; 9±). 1'he Trial .T udge 
was clearly correct in his statcnwnts to the jury regard-
ing severance damages, both in comments during trial 
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and in Instruction No. 7, requiring that these damages 
not be entirely due to the project's presence in the gen-
eral area; that the severance damages be connected with 
and caused by the severance of the defendants' land. It 
is the law that in Eminent Domain cases there may be 
noncompensable damages resulting to landowners. It is 
the jury's duty to separate noncompensable damages 
from compensable damages and allow only the constitu-
tional, "just compensation" to the condemnee. As pointed 
out in Springville Banking Company v. Burton, 10 U. 2d 
100, 349 P. 2d 157 (1960), there may be noncompensable 
damages upon the exercise of Eminent Domain, espe-
cially where there is no taking, or a tiny taking as in 
this case, 0.22 of an acre. 
In Utah Road Commission v. Hansen, 14 U. 2d 305, 
383 P. 2d 917 ( 1963), the Court stated the general rule 
that the severance damage the property owner was en-
titled to was the "difference in the value of the remaining 
tract before and after the taking." The Court held that 
it is not the burdensome obligation of the state to pay 
fair value of the property taken and also have to pay 
a resulting damage to the remainder because of a non-
cornpensable item of damages such as the cost of removal 
of personal property. 
In this case it was ultimately proper for the Trial 
Court to instruct the jury that it is possible for the same 
piece of land to suffer both compensable and noncompen-
sable damages. The problem of separation was properly 
left to the jury, (Tr. 42.) There are various limitations 
11pon compensation for depreciation in value of the re-
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maining or abutting land of a road project that are 
generally recognized. One main limitation is pointed out 
in the case of State v. District, Fonrth Jitdicial District, 
94 U. 384, 78 P. 2d 502 (1937) at Page 510: 
"We believe that a line of demarcation should be 
drawn at the point of 'actionable damage.' The 
<Constitution clearly does not require compensa-
tion for damag·es not recognized as actionable at 
common law but more a damaging of property 'to 
the actionable degree' the Constitution makers 
intended the landowner to have just compensation 
equally with the landowner whose property was 
physically taken." 
It is submitted that the Utah Constitution and U.C.A. 
78-34-10 ( 3) do not change the basic requirement of cer-
tainty of damages, but merely entitles the landowner 
whose property was not physically taken to the same 
damages that would he certain to be suffered by the 
landowner whose property was taken. The Court should 
not accord to propert~v owners whose property is not 
taken more rights to damages than a property mYner 
·whose property is taken would have. Both types of situ-
ations should be treated equally, and if a property owner 
·whose property is not taken suffers a consPquential 
damage which is noncornpensable then the property 
owner \vho is lucky enough to have a sliver, 0.22 acr(' 
in the case at bar, of his property taken by the state 
should not be allowed to recover more damag·es than the 
property owner whose property is not taken. Uncertain 
consequential, nonproximate damages should not be 
allowed in either rasP. 
It is basic that damag(~S must he certain and ascer-
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tainable. Speculative mere possibility of harm is to be 
exc1uded from compensation. 
A furher important restriction upon recovery for 
depreciated value due to proximity of the project is the 
rule that the landowner must bear, without compensation 
such depreciation that results from inconvenience and 
other type damage common to the whole neighborhood. 
If such were not the law of the land, the burden of 
administration and cost upon the condemning authority 
would be prohibitive. Further, the burden of ascertain-
ing damages and resulting benefits incurred by every 
individual in the neighborhood would be an impossible 
undertaking for the Courts, the expert witnesses and 
the juries. Each would have to become licensed clair-
voyants. 
All Courts have expressed reluctance to open the 
door to the flood of claims which would be common to 
everyone in the community. There is consistent tendency 
to allow redress only for those who have suffered real 
and substantial loss different than others in the area 
by reason of the public improvement. As stated at 170 
ALR 722: 
" ... just compensation does not include diminu-
tion in the value of the remainder caused by the 
acquisition and use of adjoining lands of others 
for the same undertaking. This general rule is 
supported by all the cases in which it appeared 
possible to separate the damages caused to the 
remainder of the O\vner 's tract by the use of the 
parcel taken from the damages caused by the 
similar use of adjoining land belonging to the 
other owners." 
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And the same reasoning, that noncompensable dam-
ages should be separated where possible, is upheld by 
C'alifornia in Rose v. Sta.te, 19 Cal. 2d 713, 123 P. 2d 505 
( 1942) pp. 520-521 : 
"In states such as Californi'a where the recovery 
of damages depends upon the infringement of 
some right which the owner of the land possesses 
in connection with his property decisions have 
clearly indicated that, although the measiJre of 
damages is generally the diminution in market 
value, the evidence relied upon t.o establi.sh such 
dimitwution must be based upon the depreciation 
flowing from the actionable injury which is the 
basis for the right to recover damages. Thus, in 
People v. Gianni, 130 Cal. App. 584, 20 P. 2d 87, 
a small portion of land was taken for public high-
way purposes. It was contended on behalf of the 
landowner that because a small portion of land 
had been taken and because he was entitled to 
recovery for that injury, the damages to his re-
maining land should be based upon the total de-
preciation in the value of his remaining property 
even though that depreciation was caused primar-
ily by an admittedly noncompensable element of 
dam'age, that is, diversion of traffic. rrhe court 
said, however that while diminution in market 
value was ordinarily the test of damage to real 
property, the, damages must be limited to those 
which accrue by reason (italics theirs) of the legal 
injury for which compensation was due. In a 
similar case, it was held that evidence as to the 
damage caused by a diversion of traffic by reason 
of highway construction was properly stricken 
from the record because the diminution in valne 
resulting therefrom was not caused by any injury 
for which the landowner was entitled to recovPr 
damages. City of Stockton v. Marengo, 137 Cal. 
App. 760 764, 31 P. 2d 4G7. It will 7Je noted tlwt 
this result was reached in California· where a tak-
ing of property was involved. (Emphasis added.) 
"A similar conclusion must also be reached where 
damage alone is involved. Many courts have indi-
cated that the diminution of value in such cases 
cannot be based upon elements of damage for 
which the landowner is not entitled to recover. 
Greer v. City of Texarkana, 201 Ark. 1041, 147 
S.\V. 2d 1004; City of Chicago v. Spoor, 190 Ill. 
340, 60 N.E. 540; Cafden Interstate Ry. Co. v. 
Smiley, 84 S.W. 523 27 Ky. Law Rep. 134; Har-
rison v. Louisiana Highway Comm., 191 La. 839, 
186 So. 354. '' 
In the railroad nuisance case of Stockdale, et al v. 
Rio Grande Western Ry. Co., et al, 77 P. 849, 28 Utah 
201 (1904), page 853, this Court stated: 
"We do not wish to be understood as holding that 
every inconvenience that an individual may be 
subject to in the possession and enjoyment of his 
property because of the construction and opera-
tion of a railroad or other public utility in the 
vicinity of his premises entitles him to damages 
or injunctive relief. The rule is well settled that 
no reoovery can be had for losses and inconven-
iences which are suffered in common with the 
general public." (Emphasis ad~ed) 
The same reasoning is well explained at 22ALR148: 
"In Austin v. Augusta Terminal R. Co., 108 G. 
671 L.R.A. 755, 34 S.E. 852 (1899), it was held 
that, 
". . . in the clause of the Georgia Constitution 
providing that 'private property shall not be 
taken or damaged for public purposes without 
just or adequate compensation being first paid, 
tlie word damaged is used in its usual sense as 
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a law term and does not ehange the substantiw 
law of damages or create a cause of action wherein 
none previously existed; nor does it abrogate tlw 
principal expressed in the phrase "damnum 
abseque injuri'a.' ... Thereafter what is damage 
by one is damage by all; and, like'wise, what is 
damn um absque injuria to one is so to all. If 
one landowner diminishes the market value of his 
neighbor's house by cutting off light and air 
therefrom, he is not required to make good th<~ 
depreciation. He had a right to build a ~wall, and 
legally speaking, he has not damaged his neigh-
bor. So, too, if a city should erect a public build-
ing, or a railroad put up a warehouse, and cut off 
the same easement of light and air, neither would 
they be liable, for they had the same right to build, 
and neither had they damaged the adjoining lot 
owner." 
In Statf Higlw:ay Commission v. Siln1, 71 N.1\I. 
350, 378 P. 2d 595 (1962), the old highway ~was left in 
place, in effect as a frontage road and barricade at a 
point beyond Silva's property. The Court citing other 
jurisdictions held that if there remains reasonable access 
to the main highway system; and, though remaining 
access may be more circuitous, his injury is the same in 
kind even though greater in degree, as that suffered hy 
the geneml public and is damnum absque injuria. That 
is the precise circumstance in the case at bar. 
Under the Utah Constitution, a person whose pro1i-
erty has sitffercd spcc:frzl damage different in any sub-
stantive degree than others for the public use has the 
same rights arnl is given the rernedie:,; for the protection 
nf his propc>rty from the injury as woulrl hc accorclecl him 
if his property was adnally tnkeu by a pri\'atc party, lint 
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~uch damage must be actionable, direct and substantial. 
rrhis notion is set forth in Springville Banking Company 
v. Burton, 10 Utah 2d 100, 349 P. 2d 157 (1960), where 
an abutting landowner was not allowed to recover for 
damages bec:ause of traffic dividing islands 
Appellants here would have us believe that because 
this Court defined the word "damages" in Board of 
Ed11cafion v. Croft, 13 Utah 2d 310, 373 P. 2d 697 (1962), 
under 78-34-10(3), it meant to say that noncompensable 
damages could never co-exist with severance damages. 
rrh:at merely because a landowner is fortunate enough 
to have a sliver of his parcel of land physically taken by 
the condemning authority, that he is entitled to collect 
damages that would be noncompensable to all other land-
mvners suffering a similar reduction in value though 
there ·was no physical taking. But the very fact that this 
Court disallmved $1,000.00 consequential damages given 
by the jury in its special verdict in Croft, stating that 
such damages were included in the award for severance 
damages, demonstrates that the Court recognized that 
it is logieal that the same piece of land may suffer both 
reeoverable and nonrecoverable damages. In the Croft 
('ase, ·when a part of the total parcel was taken, as in 
this case, nrnl the consequential damages were properly 
separated by the jury it w·as held that the landwner could 
not recover for consequential damages though a part of 
l1is land >Vas actually taken. 
It would be nrnk discrimination to allow one land-
owner to rceover damagPs that another could not recover, 
.inst lwcause he \Yas lucky Pnough to have a small part 
of his land actually taken. Such allowance would be con-
rary to the intent manifested by the Constitution. Inter-
rogatory number 3 of the special verdict "how much, if 
any, of the above are noncompensatory incidental dam-
ages,'' was properly put to the jury. Of course, the 
answer was zero, beeause the verdict of the jury was 
that the evidence did not support any loss in value due 
to the severance of the land taken (Instruction No. S), 
compensable or otherwise. 
If appellants' argument is accepted, there would 
not only be unjust discrimination and unjust compensa-
tion paid, contrary to all constitutional concepts, but 
public authorities would be required to pay more dam-
ages than a private infringing owner would be required 
to pay under the circumstance of a similar nature. That 
is, the private owner would not be liable for damages 
eonsequential in n'ature, whereas the tax paying public 
would be required to pay for any and all ordinarily non-
compensa ble damages. 
As has been pointed out, the jury verdict form 
asked for "all loss in value" because of the severance of 
the land and the construction of the project. Instruc-
tion number 9 stated that references to the word "dam-
ages" had reference to "just compensation." Instruc-
tion number 10 states that; " ... if the public takes 
lands directly involved in a project and uses it to bring 
about construction of a nature that destroys value, then 
severance damages may well be present." Instruction 
number 14 on just compensation states: "In other words, 
all of the factors and t>l<'ments afft>cting value of prop-
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erty which well-informed buyers and sellers would con-
sider can be considered by you in arriving at your de-
cision." (Emphasis added) It should be noted that the 
State's expert witness, Memory H. Cain, Jr., was asked 
questions concerning damage to the remainder, such as 
privacy, cracks, access and distance to the fill, (Tr. 68-
G9.) He also explained why he felt there had been no 
damage (Tr. GS-70) and it was the jury's right to believe 
him. The Trial Judge asked counsel for suggestions to 
relate to the jury on the difference between noncompen-
sa tory and compensatory damages, (Tr. 98) and appel-
lants ca11not now object to an improper or unclear dis-
tinguishment, if indeed there is auy confusion. 
If such instructions are considered as a whole, as the 
;jury was instructed along with testimony that there were 
no severance damage at all (Tr. GS), it is submitted that 
there is no confusion, and the issue of severance damages 
was properly and fairly submitted to the jury. 
Despite appellants' contentions, there is no basis 
to assume that the reason Mr. Cain, the state's appraiser, 
found no severance damage, was because he was using 
the ( 'ourt 's definition of what constituted severance dam-
age. Appraisers can and do differ widely in their opin-
ions. Mr. Cain was asked in his opinion if there was 
any severance damage. He answered no, and gave good 
reasons wlw he felt there had been no damage. He felt 
that there was better access, better privacy and the same 
sno\v removal and garbage pick up. He also said that 
some other liomt'S in the a r0a similar!)· situated had suf-
fen'<l no (1amage eithN, (T'r. G8-78). The Comt had not 
)·et mcntio110<l Slim Olse11 's case or the 8e Rancho ::\Iotel. 
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If all of the instructions and testimony be taken as 
a whole, bearing in mind the fact that appellants had 
the burden of proof, it is logical, proper and simple to 
see that the jury believed the state and not the land-
owner. There is no basis to assume that the verdict form 
is incorrect or confusing. Interrogatory number 1 asked 
for the loss in value, not the confusing word "damage", 
in the remaining land and iniprD?.:f1nents (emphasis 
a<lded) because of the severance "and the construction 
of the project as designed." Taken with the other two 
interrogatories asking for a separation of "severance 
damages'' and 11011compensatory incidental damages, not 
the confusing word "consequential," any reasonable per-
son would at once understand that the first interrogatory 
asked for all damages caused by the entire project, if 
any there was. The form is as correct and clear as is 
the verdict of the jury. The verdict should be upheld -
to do othenvise would be to invade the province of the 
JUry. 
POINT II. 
THE DOCTRINE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IS 
APPLICABLE IN EMINENT DOMAIN CASES IN 
THAT THERE IS NO CONSENT TO BE SUED FOR 
NONCOMPENSABLE DAMAGES. 
The Trial ·Court was most certainly not confm;ed 
concerning the application of the Doctrine of Sovereign 
Immunit:·. _At no point in the trial was the doctrine advo-
cated or instrnctions given 011 it. Furthermore the verdict 
form makes no referenee to the doctrine. Reference 
by appellants to the doctrine is a men' shallow to confmw 
the issues. 
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Inferences by appellants taken to mean that the 
Trial Court improperly applied the Symes case and 
that sovereign immunity controlled this case is not borne 
out by the Court's comments to the jury or instructions 
to the jury. The Judge's comment that the mere fact that 
appellants vvere in Court does not expand the scope 
of severance damages, (Tr. 12), was made in chambers 
and never reached the jury's ears. Never was the appel-
lants' right to be in Court or their rights to damages 
suffered, if any, challenged. All of the Court's comments 
Symes, Fairclough and Hansen were merely directed as 
an aid in assessing the type and amount of damages, if 
any. 
Appellants cite St.a.te Road Commission v. Fourth 
District Court, 9-1 Utah 384, 78 P. 2d 502 (1937), as 
overturning the doctrine of sovereign immunity when 
there is no physical land taking. This Court in that case 
explained that the consent of the state to be sued is not 
ordinarily implied and that "the line of demarcation 
should be drawn at the point of 'actionable damage,' 
page 510. 
All of the eases cited by appellants sho\v that the 
soYereign, under the constitution and the statute, has 
only consented to be sued in cases where there are dam-
ages actionable under common law definitions of damages 
and just compensation. There can be no implied consent 
to suit for damages that are unjust or noncompensable. 
ln the ease of Dooly Block v. Salt Lake Rapid Transit 
Co., 9 Utah 31, 33 P. 229 (1893), this Court recognized 
that the abutting propPrty owner could recover for an 
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established right of easement because "he had rights not 
Hhared by the public at large, special and peculiar to him-
self." The Court allowed recovery for damages that were 
special and unique and distinguislta ble from those sus-
tained by other properties in the neighborhood, the log-
ical inference being that the soYereign only consents to be 
sued for special, actionable damages. Therefore, it can't 
be contended that the last sentence of Instruction number 
7 conccrui11g noncompe11sahle damages that are not spe-
cial or unique ·was prejudicial. 
The attempted definition of "highway purposes" in 
U.C.A. 27-12-96 cited by the appellants at Page 28 of 
their brief, implies sovereign consent to be sued in all 
eases where rights of access, air, light and view are 
incidentally interferred ·with. Such an interpretation 
would loose a flood gate of suits from landowners and 
abutters who would be looking for treasure trove and 
windfalls. The case of Ut.ah Road Commission v. Hwnsen, 
14 Utah 2d 305, 383 P. 2d 917 (1963), recognizes the pub-
lic necessity of reasonable limitations on damages in con-
demnation proceedings. The Court recognized an ease-
ment as a property right that would be compensable only 
if it were suustantia.lly i11terferred ·with, or if the owner 
were not left with some reason.able means of access to 
the highways as instruction number 10 states. This view 
is set forth at '.26 Am. Jur., section 200, Eminent 
Domain: 
"Indeed, it has been held that a substantial or 
material impairment of or interference with an 
abutting owner's right of reasonable access, by 
the public authoritieH, is a taking of his property, 
even though he iH not totally deprived of all 
14 
access. But the right of the abutting property 
owner is subject to the rights of the public to use 
the street for highway purposes. Inasmuch as the 
rights of the abutter are subordinate to the rights 
of the public, there is no taking of private prop-
erty where streets are used and i1nproved for the 
purpose of a highway." (Emphasis added) 
Also 26 Am. JHr. 242: 
"It is not always easy to determine what con-
stitute·s special or peculiar damage for which the 
private owner may maintain an action for the 
vacation or discontinuance of a street or highway. 
No general rule has been laid down which can 
readily be applied to every case. It is not enough 
that the vacation results merely in some incon-
venience to his access, or compels a more cir-
cuitous route of access, or a diversion of travel 
in front of the premises, and ·a consequent diminu-
tion of value. To sustain the right of a claimant 
to compensation, it must appear that the loss 
results from the depreciation in value of his land 
because of the change in the street, and his loss 
must he direct and proximate, and so obvious 
and substantial a.s to admit calculation." 
The jury in this case could and did find that there 
were no damages of any kind to the i·emaining tract of 
land. The jury found that appellants were left with 
reasonable acct>ss, light, air, and view as was testified 
to at the trial by Mr. Cain. The verdict is clear that the 
jury found no damages, compensable or othenvise, as it 
is exceedingly apparent they believed the testimony of 
the state - not the landowner. 
Jury Instructions number 7, 10 and 1-1 properly 
presented the la1v of Utah concerning consequential dam-
1;) 
ages. I nstrurtion nurnhPr 7 concerned the reduction in 
value as severance darnage, qualifiPd by the fact that 
damages dut~ to project's presence in the general area 
must be related to the taking. 
This view is upheld by the Ftah cases cited, espe-
cially the Fourth District case r0qniring "actionable 
damages," and also i11 26 Am. Jur., section 201 "Un-
der Constitutional Provisions Req11iring Compens.aition 
Where Propery Is Damaged." 
"In some jurisdictions it appears to be the rule 
that the change in the constitution, providing for 
cornpensation where private property is damaged 
for a public use, effected no material change in tlw 
right of abutting owners to compensation; then• 
must be a taking of property after the amend-
ment, the same as before (common law physical 
taking) 
" ... it would seem that the abutter is entitld to 
compensation whenever the public use inflicts 
damage on adjoining property. The only practi-
cal test is whether or not the market value (the 
before and after rule) of the property is dimin-
ished by the use, such diminution in value being 
different from that s1.tff erc,d by the comm1111ity at 
large; there can be no olloivance for personal in-
convenience and discomfort, n°or is a mere sc11ti-
niental disturbance an element of injury for 1rhich 
recovery nwy be had." (Emphasis added) 
In Instnwtion nnrnlwr 1-l: the jury was instructed 
that just conqwmmtion ineluded, " ... all of the factors 
and elPments affrctiug value of property which Wt~ll­
informed hu:n·rs and sellers would consider," including 
its topography. Sun·ly this is not a misuse of the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity. On the contrary, the jury 
was instructed to compensate the respondents for all of 
the compensable elements of damages that the sovereign 
had consented to. Again, the jury could have found dam-
ages to the severed tract, had they thought it damaged, 
though noncompensable. They found none, which is really 
the essence of this case. 
It does not require extensive analysis to understand 
that if this Court were to hold that the sovereign had 
eo11sc11ted to be sued for all damages, even those that are 
not actionable, special, proximate or direct, it would not 
only be against precedent but ridiculously costly to the 
sovereign and other condemning authorities. 
CONCLUSION 
The jury considered all of the testimony. They 
tested the credibility of the witnesses with a view of the 
property. They received clear and intelligent instruc-
tions and returned a verdict of no money damage to the 
1·<·mai11der compensable or otherwise. Full academic 
discussions could ha\·c heen justified if the jury had 
fournl money damages, but not compensable under the 
Court's instructions. In this case, the properly impan-
(•led and \vell-informed jury should be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
George E. Bridwell 
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